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Three Views of Equal Protection:
A Backdrop to Bakket
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. *
The facts of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke'
are common knowledge among lawyers and laymen alike. Briefly,
the University of California a t Davis Medical School operated
two separate admissions programs: a preferential admissions program for members of certain minority groups, and a regular admissions program for all other applicants. Minority applicants
competed only against each other for sixteen of the one hundred
available places. As a result, the qualifications of certain minority
admittees as measured by undergraduate grades and test scores
were significantly inferior to those of nonminority admittees.*The
University argued that the admissions program was necessary to
achieve its goal of filling a t least sixteen of the one hundred seats
of each class with minority students. Allan Bakke applied to
Davis in 1973 and 1974, but was not accepted either year even
though his test scores and grades were substantially superior to
the averages of the minority admittees? He subsequently brought
suit alleging that the University,
by virtue of its maintenance and operation of the special admission program, prevented him solely because of his race from
competing for all of the available places a t the medical school
and thereby discriminated against him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the California Constitution . . .
as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ; and . . . that
because of this unlawful discrimination, [the University] denied him admission to the medical scho01.~

t Q 1979 by J. Frederic Voros, Jr.

* Assistant to the President, Ricks College, Rexburg, Idaho. B.A., 1975, Brigham
Young Universtiy; J.D., 1978, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. Brief for Respondent at 13, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(19%).
The University insisted that all the admittees-including minority applicants-were
fully qualified to study medicine at Davis. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Brief for Respondent at 13.
4. Id. at 15.
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The California Supreme Court held that Bakke was entitled to
admission to the Davis Medical School and that the preferential
admissions program offended the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Con~titution.~
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The major issue before the Court was whether a
racial classification that is designed to aid minority applicants,
but which incidentally disadvantages nonminority applicants on
account of their race, violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court's answer to that question was
less than decisive. Like the nation, the Court found itself deeply
divided on the question of the legality of preferential admissions
programs. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun
took the position that the preferential admissions program of the
On the ather
Davis Medical School was entirely ~onstitutional.~
hand, Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger saw the University's program as a simple violation of
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and would therefore have
affirmed the California court's decision on statutory ground^.^
Justice Powell agreed in part with the Stevens-Burger-StewartRehnquist position, and held that Bakke should have been admitted? On the other hand, he also agreed in part with the BrennanWhite-Marshall-Blackmun position, and held that raceconscious admissions programs are not categorically unconstitutional? Justice Powell distinguished between programs assigning
a prescribed number of seats for minority applicants, which he
ruled unconstitutional, and those merely taking race into account
as one of many factors in the admissions process, which he ruled
constitutional.
The outpouring of scholarly and popular opinion on the issue
of preferential admissions, as well as affirmative action generally,
5. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34,553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680 (1976), aff'd in part, reu'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. 438 U.S. at 355-79. (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun also contributed
separate opinions, Justice White's focusing on the question of a private right of action
under title VI, id. at 379-87 (White, J., separate opinion); Justice Marshall's on the need
to dissipate the effects of black slavery and its vestiges, id. a t 387-402 (Marshall, J.,
separate opinion); and Justice Blackman's on the need to allow universi4ies to consider
race just as they do other differences, id. a t 402-08 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
7. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens' opinion.
8. Id. at 271.
9. Id. a t 272.
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has been even more sharply divided than the Court's decision in
Bakke. Widely divergent views on the Consitution, justice, and
the role of the judiciary have created the appearance of a philosophical free-for-all.1°And while Bakke has by no means quieted
the donnybrook, the case did succeed in crystallizing some of the
questions a t the heart of the debate. That fact alone makes the
decision worthy of close attention.
Moreover, the fundamental and historical disagreement over
the meaning of equal protection was not resolved in Bakke. Because of this, almost no one endorses the decision without qualification. Indeed, only one member of the Court that produced it
subscribes to it in its entirety. The inability of the Court to adopt
a single view of the equal protection clause virtually ensured that
its decision could not be definitive.

The ambiguity of the wording of the equal protection clausell
and the unevenness of its application have caused scholars and
judges to differ sharply as to what the clause means or ought to
mean.12 Three philosophical views of equal protection have been
advanced, and nearly all arguments dealing with preferential
admissions are based on one or more of these views. The following
subparts attempt to explore the principles and assumptions underlying the major views of the equal protection clause.

A.

The Utilitarian View: Protection for Socially Useful
Characteristics

In its extreme form, the "utilitarian view" does not regard
race as a category to be accorded especially vigilant protection,
but instead requires courts to treat racial classifications just as
they treat classifications based on age, occupation, height, or any
other characteristic. That is, courts should decide first whether
10. "No case in recent memory has so fractured the community of human rights
proponents as this one." Margolis, The Aching Bakke: Is There a Cure?, 51 CONN.B.J.
417, 418 (1977) (footnote omitted). A total of 58 amicus curiae briefs were filed. Id. at 418
n.6. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Preferential Minority Admissions Programs
in State Professional Schooki, 45 U.M.K.C.L. REV.343 (1977).
11. "No State shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protecamend. XIV, 6 1.
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST.
12. "One can advance cogent arguments, buttressed by an impressive array of case
analysis and significant socio-politicalor economic theory, both for and against the reverse
discrimination inherent in preferential minority admissions." Renfrew, Affirmative Action: A Plea for a Rectification Principle, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 597, 598 (1977).

.

28

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

the classification will aid or frustrate society's attempts to
achieve its goals, and then allow or invalidate the classification
based on that decision.
The suggestion that the equal protection clause does not afford race any special protection initially seems so unreasonable
as to be unworthy of serious consideration. The utilitarian view
is, however, a t least plausible in instances where society's majority attempts to aid a previously disadvantaged minority by creating classifications that are to the majority's own detriment. A
number of commentators have advanced arguments implicitly
founded upon such a view. For example, some have suggested
that racial and ethnic backgrounds are relevant factors to be
considered in evaluating an applicant, and that they may be
considered by state-supported universities along with such qualifications as letters of recommendation, community service, interviews, leadership capacity, sex, home state,13"athletic or musical
ability, personality,"14 and other special needs." This view is represented, at least in the case of benign discrimination, by Justice
Blackmun's comment finding it "ironic" that we should be more
disturbed "over a program where race is an element of consciousness," i.e., a basis for selection, than we are over the fact that
universities have traditionally "given conceded preferences up to
a point to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of
alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the
famous, and the powerful."I6
Professor Terrance Sandalow has presented what is by far
the most cogent and persuasive defense of this position:
"Legislation that employs racial or ethnic criteria is not subject
to a special constitutional rule. Its validity depends upon a judgment about whether it will lead us toward or away from the kind
of society we want."17 In leading toward "the kind of society we
13. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 YALEL.J. 699, 702-04 (1971).
14. O'Neil, Racial Preferences and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA.L.
REV. 925, 945 (1974).
L. REV. 1065, 117615. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
77 (1969).
16. 438 U.S.at 404 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
It cannot be said, however, that Justice Blackmun totally adopted the utilitarian view
of equal protection, since he joined Justice Brennan's opinion based on the preferential
view. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
17. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and
the Judicial Role, 42 U . CHI.L. REV. 653, 682 (1975).
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want, " equal protection requires two things.
The first requirement of equal protection under Sandalow's
analysis is that every statute be applied to all violators without
reference to personal differences not specified in the statute. For
example, a statute forbidding sleeping on park benches, to comport with equal protection guarantees, must be enforced against
all violators without regard to race, sex, position, wealt'h, or any
other consideration not mentioned in the statute. Thus, equal
protection consists of adherence to the terms of the statute.l8
However, if the equal protection clause is to be preserved as
an instrument capable of invalidating discriminatory legislation,
it must be invested with a second, broader meaning. "What the
equal protection clause does require," writes Sandalow, "is that
government treat similarly all those who are similarly situated."lV
The weakness of this prescription is that it does not of itself
provide any guide to determining when two persons are similarly
situated. To an extent it is "value free" because it leaves "the
material principles which determine whether individuals are similarly or differently situated" to "rest upon [unspecified] value
choices."20For example, the question of whether a state may treat
illegitimate children differently from legitimate children for purposes of intestate distribution cannot be solved by resort to the
phrase "treat similarly those similarly situated." Some theory
of concrete values must be applied to determine whether legitimate and illegitimate children are similarly situated. Yet the
Supreme Court has frequently invoked equal protection analysis
without reference to any specific theory. "The Court's failure to
develop such a theory, during a period of intense use of the clause,
has left the law of equal protection in intellectual d i ~ a r r a y . " ~ ~
If application of the equal protection clause requires reference to some substantive set of values, a question arises as to
what values should be recognized. In the context of university
admissions this question might be phrased, "What characteris18. Id. at 656.
19. Id. at 655. '[A111 persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' " Reed
v. Reed, 404 U S . 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.412,415
(1920)).
20. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 655. "Now, that similar particular cases, as defined
by a practice, should be treated similarly as they arise, is part of the very concept of a
practice; it is involved in the notion of an activity in accordance with rules." Rawls,
Justice as Fairness, 67 P m o s o ~ m REV.
c ~ ~ 164,166 (1958),reprinted in H. BEDAU,
JUSTICE
AND EQUALITY
78-79 (1971). See also Lucas, Against Equulity, 40 ~'HILOSOPHY 296 (1965),
reprinted in H. BEDAU,
supra, at 138.
21. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 662 n.27.
'"
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tics may be legitimately considered by a state-supported university in evaluating applicants?"
Race is probably not a legally permissible consideration because it is generally accepted that applicants equal in all respects
other than race are similarly situated. But Sandalow argues that
the touchstone for evaluating applicants' qualifications should be
social utility: "To the extent social utility is served, race and
ethnicity may even be seen as measures of c~mpetence."~~
One objection to the social utility standard has been voiced
by Professor Richard Posner. Rejecting that standard in favor of
a rule prohibiting "the distribution of benefits and costs by government on racial or ethnic ground^,"^ he claims that only such
a per se rule "is sufficiently precise and objective to limit a
judge's exercise of personal whim and preferen~e."~~
Sandalow
counters by insisting that Posner's principle holds no special
claim to objectivity:
Value choices necessarily underlie the selection of one or another
principle, and, absent societal agreement upon either the values
or the source from which they are to be derived, there is no
escape from the risk that the principle selected will reflect values personal to the judge. The principle Posner would have the
Court adopt is, thus, neither more nor less "objective" than a
principle which would sanction minority preferences?

In other words, Sandalow argues that Posner's standard is
also based on subjective valuations, and that there are other principles than the one Posner suggests that are no less objective, but
that still sanction minority preferences. A rule requiring state
universities to prefer qualified blacks to equally or better qualified whites would be such a rule. Adopting this rule would limit
judicial capriciousness in a way similar to the way Posner's per
se rule would. However, no matter how objective the rules are, the
question of which rule to apply is, Sandalow asserts, necessarily
subjective. The social utility standard is thus intended to be
transmaterial: its function is to provide some benchmark by
which the judge can select among material principles.
There are a t least two difficulties with the social utility
standard. Firstly, the standard itself is not a material principle,
22. Id. at 674.
23. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential neatment
of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP.CT. REV. 1, 22 (1975).
24. Id.
25. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 677.
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but rather a hollow form into which each individual must pour
his own values. Whenever a formula which is not itself a material
principle is appealed to as an evaluative standard, some other
concrete set of values-a material principle-must implicitly be
invoked. Sandalow's solution is therefore circular. He recommends the social utility standard as a means by which a judge
can select one material principle from a pool of equally objective
material principles. However, the judge must first implicitly or
explicitly invoke one of the material principles because until he
does the social utility standard is meaningless. Sandalow would
therefore insist that the judge select a principle in order to know
which principle to select. For example, "race is irrelevant" and
"minorities ought to be preferred" are both material principles.
To the judge who must decide which to apply, Sandalow recommends the one that will lead to the desired kind of society. And
what kind of a society is desired? The answer to that question
depends on the judge's subjective preferences.
The second difficulty with the social utility standard as a
guide by which to select a material principle is that, even while
it does not of itself favor any material principle, it seems to foreclose certain types of arguments that might be made for or
against the selection of a particular material principle. The very
term "social utility" implies that the judge engaged in the selection process must justify his ultimate choice in utilitarian terms.
Nearly any material principle, certainly Posner's per se rule, can
and perhaps ought to be defended on utilitarian grounds. But
why must courts refuse to entertain or offer justifications based
on other grounds? For example, fairness and justice are also reasonable justifications for selecting a material principle. Unquestionably, the problem of preferential admissions has ayery pronounced moral dimension, and whatever disposition courts make
of the matter ought to comport with generally held notions of
justice and fairness. Ignoring the moral dimension of the problem
puts one in the position of the utilitarian who, as John Rawls
observes, may argue "that slavery is unjust on the grounds that
the advantages to the slaveholder as slaveholder do not counterbalance the disadvantages to the slave and to society a t large."26
By insisting that whatever rule is adopted be adopted on the
ground that it will lead toward the desired kind of society, Sandalow overlooks one of the premises of moral action: the end cannot
26. Rawls, supra note 20, at 188, reprinted in H . BEDAU,
supra note 20, at 96.
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justify the means. Justice requires that the means be scrutinized
independently of the ends, and that no end, however laudable, be
pursued by unjust methods. It is this notion that lies at the heart
of most of the safeguards of criminal procedure.
While Sandalow's analysis is useful in explaining judicial
behavior, it cannot direct or restrain a court attempting to interpret the Constitution. A constitutional guarantee based on social
utility is too fluid a guarantee; an aggrieved party is at the mercy
of the court's subjective judgment, unrestrained by any material
principle, as to the social utility of the alleged constitutional
violation. Although today it may serve social utility to include
minorities in professional schools, not long ago many believed
that it served social utility to exclude them. In that day, a social
utility standard would have permitted unrestrained discrimination. Such a standard inevitably countenances official capriciousness, especially in close cases, and thereby reduces a constitutional right to a systematically applied judicial whimsy.27

B. The Preferential View: Enhanced Protection for Minority
Races Only
This second view of the equal protection clause dictates that
only "invidious" racial classifications are subject to the Court's
"strict scrutiny'' test; "benign" discrimination need only meet
some lower standard of review. Under traditional two-tier equal
protection analysis, this lower standard would be the "rational
basis" test, which validates any classification for which a rational
basis can be found.28An intermediate standard has also been
suggested for use in benign discrimination cases. The Brennan
opinion in Bakke, for example, argued that "benign" racial classifications, in order to pass constitutional scrutiny, " 'must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' ""
27. Or, put another way, the view is reminiscent of Ambme Bierce's definition of
THE
"lawful": "Compatible with the will of a judge having jurisdiction." A. BIERCE,
D m ' s D I ~ O N A 75
R Y(1958).
28. That standard has been recommended for reverse discrimination cases. Willey,
The Case for Preferential Admissions, 21 How. L.J. 175, 201-08 (1978).
29. 438 U.S.at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.190, 197 (1976)).TFiis6raniof
review would be "strict and searching," though not " ' "strict" in theory and fatal in
fact.' " Id. at 362 (quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 80
HARV.L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Others have advanced such an intermediate standard. For example, the New York
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Regardless of which lower standard is adopted for nonpreferred groups, the key feature of the "preferential view" is that it
applies the highest level of judicial review only to "invidious"
discrimination. Invidious is used to characterize discrimination
directed toward certain racially or ethnically defined groups that
is accompanied by "stigmatization." The legal result of this formulation is to accord members of stigmatized minority groups
preferred status in equal protection cases.
I . Indicia of suspectness

One theory upon which the preferential view of equal protection is based may be described using the term "indicia of suspectness." This theory holds that the reason the Court has policed
and invalidated governmental actions evidencing racial discrimination with such vigor is not because racial discrimination is in
itself illegal or unconstitutional, but rather because the groups
discriminated against bear certain marks of victimization. Under
this theory, establishing the existence of those marks is a prerequisite to the Court's applying its strictest scrutiny. The following
statement is typical of this position:
There are three traditional explanations for the suspectness of
racial classifications provided by Supreme Court decisions.
First, such classifications are the product of pervasive and historic discrimination. Second, their effect is to stigmatize and
stereotype individuals belonging to groups identifiable because
they share immutable characteristics. Lastly, the groups so classified have been politically powerless and, thus, unable to protect sufficiently their interest?

Such arguments can often be traced to a statement in Sun Antonio Independent School District u. Rodriguez:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines
have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is
Court of Appeals, in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, ruled that "benign" classifications must serve a "substantial state interest" which "need not be urgent, paramount or
compelling." 39 N.Y.2d 326, 335-36, 348 N.E.2d 537,545,384 N.Y.S.2d 82,90 (1976). See
also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law
School Admissions, 75 COLUM.
L. REV.559,565-79 (1975); Project, Preferential Admissions
to Professional Schools: The Equal Protection Challenge, 22 VILL.L. REV. 983, 1004-07
(1977).
30. Case Comment, Bakke v. The Regents of the University of California: Preferential Racial Admissions, An Unconstitutional Approach Paved with Good Intentions?,'l2
NEW ENC.L. REV. 719, 739 (1977) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Preferential
Racial Admissions].
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not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.31

In United Jewish Organizations u. Carey,32Justice Brennan referred to these indicia as the "considerations that historically led
us to treat race as a constitutionally 'suspect' method of classifying individuals.
The approach is fraught with difficulties. First of all, it ascribes to the reasoning in the Court's previous discrimination
cases a major premise which differs from that historically employed by the Court. Many commentators and some justices3'
argue that the Court's decisions invalidating racially discriminatory practices have been based on a syllogism such as this: (1)the
Constitution prohibits state action that discriminates by stigmatizing members of victimized, discrete, and powerless minorities;
(2) the state action in question discriminates by stigmatizing
members of a victimized, discrete, and powerless minority; and
therefore, (3) the Constitution prohibits the state action in question.
Brennan's opinion in Bakke cited a number of cases supporting the proposition that "[only] racial classifications that stigmatize . . . are invalid without more," which he called "our prior
~
cases do not, however, establish the
analytic f r a m e ~ o r k . "Those
31. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), is also commonly cited in support of this
position. See, e.g., Broderick, Beferential Admissions and the Brown Heritage, 8 N.C.
CENT.L.J. 123, 148 n.116 (1977); Maltz, Justice Rehnquist at the Crossroads-Principle,
Politics, and the Bakke Case, 30 OKLA.L. REV. 922, 923 (1977); Renfrew, supra note 12,
a t 603; 28 CASEW. RES.L. REV. 238, 263 n.169 (1977).
The extraordinary popularity of the footnote in the race area has come about despite
the fact that it is found in a case dealing with the interstate shipment of "filled milk"
and also the fact that it never reached a cmclusion: "Nor need we enquire . . . whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
32. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
33. Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). He also referred to them in Bakke.
438 U.S. at 356-60 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
.--- and dissenting in part).
34. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. a t 357-58 (Brennan, White,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. Id. It has been suggested that "[wlith the exception of Justice Rehnquist, all
current members of the Court have demonstrated a degree of commitment to [the indicia
of suspectness test]." Maltz, supra note 31, at 923. However, none of the cases Maltz cites
in support of the proposition were race cases.
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proposition that stigmatization or invidiousness is necessary to
trigger strict scrutiny. Most often, those factors are mentioned to
demonstrate that the racial classification under consideration
had no legitimate purpose (i.e., a compelling interest independent of the classification itself). Because all racial discrimination
that is not necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose is unconstitutional, and no invidious purpose is ever legitimate, invidious
racial discrimination is always unconstitutional. But it is the
absence of a legitimate purpose, and not the presence of an invidious one, that fatally flaws a racial classification. This interpretation is borne out by an examination of the cases cited by the
Brennan opinion in Bakke.
In Yick Wo v. hop kin^,^^ for example, the Court declared:
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is
shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for
it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not jusitified. The discrimination is . . . illegal?'

The discrimination was illegal because "no reason for it [was]
shown." The Court mentioned hostility only to demonstrate that
no justifiable reason for the discrimination existed. Korematsu v.
United States3s presented a similar situation. When the Court
wrote, "[olur task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a
case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentrathey could not have
tion camp because of racial prejudi~e,"~@
meant that strict scrutiny applies only where the discriminatory
classification is the result of racial prejudice. If that were what
they believed, they would not have applied strict scrutiny in the
case before them, since-as demonstrated by the language
quoted-they did not consider the classification in that case to be
the result of prejudice.40In other words, the use of the strict
scrutiny standard indicates that the Court believed this standard
should apply even when the classification was not invidious. By
referring to racial prejudice they were merely restating what the
36. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
37. Id. at 374.
38. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
39. Id. at 223.
40. Indeed, the Korematsu Court's own statement of the standard belies Justice
Brennan's interpretation: "[Alll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all svch restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."
Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
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Yick Wo Court had declared: if the purpose of the classification
is to malign, the case is easy because no further scrutinization of
the purpose is necessary. Likewise, Strauder v. West Virginia41
did not establish that only discrimination victims who are members of stigmatized minorities are entitled to the strictest judicial
scrutiny. The discrimination victims in Strauder were denied the
right to serve on juries. That they were black evoked the following
language from the Court, which seems to support the Rodriguez
model:
[Tlhe words of the [fourteenth] amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,-the
right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,-exemption from legal discriminations,
implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of
their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition
of a subject race.42

However, the Court went on to say, "that the West Virginia statute . . . is such a discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor
would it be if the persons excluded by it were white men.
Brennan's opinion in Bakke also referred to a passage in
Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Oyarna v. C a l i f ~ r n i aa, ~ ~
case dealing with an alien's right to transfer land. Justice Murphy
used rational basis language to describe the "rare cases" in which
a state may
single out a class of persons, such as ineligible aliens, for distinctive treatment. . .
Such a rational basis is completely lacking where, as here,
the discrimination stems directly from racial hatred and intolerance. The Constitution of the United States . .insists that our
government . . . shall respect and observe the dignity of each
individual, whatever may be the name of his race, the color of
his skin or the nature of his beliefs.45

.

.

The only language in this passage that seems to indicate a special
rule for invidious discrimination is Justice Murphy's reference to
racial hatred, a purpose that is insufficient to withstand strict or
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Id. at 307-08.
Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
332 U.S. 633 (1948).

Id. at 663.
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any other sort of scrutiny. On the other hand, the last passage
quoted implies that all discrimination victims are entitled to literally "equal" protection.
Brennan's Bakke opinion also cited Brown u. Board of
EducationMto bolster its view that only those classifications that
stigmatize minorities are subject to strict scrutiny. A close reading of the case reveals, however, that the Court resorted to the
stigma concept not as a prerequisite to applying strict judicial
scrutiny, but for a very different purpose. In that case, Chief
Justice Warren wrote the following:
In the instant cases . . .there are findings below that the Negro
and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications
and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these
tangible factors . . . . We must look instead to the effect of
segregation itself on public ed~cation.~?

Why could the Court's opinion not turn on the mere fact that the
schools were segregated? Why did the Court feel that it had to
look elsewhere for a foothold from which to invalidate the
segregation? In 1954 the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy
u. F e r g u ~ o nhad
~ ~ been well established for over half a century.
Brown did not, in principle, repudiate it." Instead, the Court
used the Plessy analysis to show that where the separation was
racially motivated equality was impossible. What the "separate
but equal" doctrine required was something akin to standing: the
complainant had to show that he was in fact harmed, or in other
words, that his facilities were not equal. Thus, if the school he
attended was as well equipped and staffed as any other school,
he could show no harm, and so was not entitled to relief. Brown
fell squarely within that framework." Brown differed from Plessy
only by finding, in the very fact of segregation, a harm; because
the Brown Court found that harm, it panted relief. The harm it
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Id. at 492 (footnotes omitted).
48. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
49. "The Court dodged a direct challenge to Plessy by holding that segregated public
schools are, as an empirical matter, 'inherently unequal.' " Zimmer, Beyond DeFunis:
Disproportionate Impact Analysis and Mandated "Preferences" in Law School
Admissions, 54 N.C.L. REV. 317, 354 (1976).
50. Indeed, the slogan-like sentence which crystallized the meaning of
Brown-"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"374 U.S.at 495-is cast
in terms of the Plessy formula.
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found was, of course, the psychological debilitation allegedly suffered as a result of the stigma implied in segregation. There is no
implication in the case that the finding of stigma was in any way
prerequisite to strictest scrutiny; on the contrary, the stigma was
the harm against which the Constitution protected the plaintiffs.
Brown does not support the Brennan opinion's thesis that only
stigmatizing classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.
The racial classifications invalidated in the above cases were
expressions of racial animqs. It does not follow, however, that the
purpose behind a statute defines the reviewing court's level of
scrutiny. It cannot be said that an invalid racial classification
that was based on prejudice was invalidated only because it was
based on racial prejudice. Nor can one conclude that the Court
ought to validate all classifications that are not based on invidious racial prejudice. None of the cases from Brennan's Bakke
opinion discussed to this point forecloses the Court from consistently invoking strict scrutiny in a reverse discrimination case.51
Finally, the Brennan opinion cited United Jewish Organizations v. Carey? The case is admittedly problematical. The State
of New York was required under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to
reapportion the voting districts in three counties and to secure the
U.S. Attorney General's approval of the redistricting plan. Voting
district lines under the plan were drawn to ensure that blacks and
Puerto Ricans, as a group, would constitute a 65% majority in a
predetermined number of districts. The purpose of the reapportionment was to allow the relative political strength of the minorities to be reflected in the state senate and assembly. An incidental result of the redistricting plan was the splitting of an enclave
of Hasidic Jews, whose community had previously been contained in a single voting district, into two districts. Had the Jews
remained in a single district, the goal of 65% would have been
missed by 1.6% in one of the districts." The Jewish community,
whose voting strength had thus been diluted, raised an equal
protection challenge. The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion
by Justice White, upheld the plan.
The Court did not deal with the Jewish community as a
minority group (although it was apparently "discrete and insu51. The Breman opinion in Bakke also cited three other cases which yield to the same
analysis: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967);
and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 438 U.S. at 358.
52. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
53. Id. at 182 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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lar"54); rather, the Court treated the complainants merely as
members of the white population. As a result, it found no harm:
There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation, the
State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But its
plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites
or any other race, and we discern no discrimination violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . [Tlhere was no fencing out
of the white population from participation in the political processes of the county."

. .

Justice White's language is critical. Although he mentions "racial
slur" and "stigma," those elements are not treated as necessary
components of an equal protection challenge. Had he written, "its
plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites
or any other race, and so we discern no discrimination violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment," the opinion would have provided
considerable support for Justice Brennan's position in Bakke.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the voting plan easily
withstood the fourteenth amendment attack. There are, however,
a t least two critical factors present in United Jewish
Organizations that were absent in Bakke. The first is the essentially remedial action taken under the Voting Rights Act. The
provision of the Act requiring New York's reapportionment plan
to be submitted to the U.S. Attorney General was applied
"whenever it was administratively determined that certain conditions which experience had proved were indicative of racial discrimination in voting had existed in the area."" Furthermore,
there was evidence that voting in the counties "was racially polarized and that the district lines had been created with the purpose
or effect of diluting the voting strength of nonwhites (blacks and
Puerto R i ~ a n s ) . "United
~~
Jewish Organizations is, therefore,
"properly viewed" as a validation of a "remedy for an administraThere was no such finding of
tive finding of dis~rimination."~~
past discrimination in Bakke.
Secondly, as Justice White observed, "there was no fencing
out of the white population from participation in the political
processe~"~~
in United Jewish Organizations. Even the complain54. Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 165 (White, J., separate opinion).
56. Id. at 156-57. Here, those conditions were an English literacy test and less than a
50% voter turnout in the 1968 presidential election. Id.
57. Id. at 149-50.
58. 438 U.S. at 305.
59. 430 U.S. at 165.
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ants argued only that the state had diluted, not destroyed, their
voting strength. On the other hand, under preferential programs
like the one in Bakke, "some individuals are excluded from a
state-provided benefit-admission to the Medical School-they
otherwise would receive. "60
In short, while Justice Brennan's attempt to establish the
Rodriguez indicia of suspectness test as the "analytic framework"
within which all equal protection cases are decided seems to find
more support in United Jewish Organizations than in the other
cases cited in his opinion, that case too falls far short of demonstrating that stigma or the other elements mentioned in
Rodriguez are necessary preconditions to the invocation of strict
scrutiny. Taken as a whole, the cases cited in the Brennan opinion are less susceptible to neat categorization than the opinion's
treatment would suggest. Indeed, Justice Powell challenged the
characterization:

...

This tationale
has never been invoked in our decisions as a
prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict
scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a particular classification is invidious. . . . Racial and ethnic classifications . are subject to stringent examination without regard
to these additional characteristic^.^^

. .

As Justice Powell pointed out, the legacy of the Court's decisions describes a syllogism more like this: (1) the Constitution
prohibits unjustified state action that discriminates against individuals on the basis of race; (2) the state action in question unjustifiably discriminates against individuals on the basis of race; and
therefore, (3) the Constitution prohibits the state action in question. Landmark cases support this model.62Several pronouncements are significant. "What is [the equal protection clause] but
declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the
black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white,
60. 438 U.S. at 305.
61. Id. at 290.
62. It may be argued that Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its
progeny demonstrate that "racial classifications are apparently not invalid per se." Project, Referential Admissions to Professional Schools: The Equal Protection Challenge, 22
V u . L. REV. 983, 993 (1977). Justice Powell, in Bakke, pointed out thatthese cases,-as
well as the employment discrimination cases, are "inapposite," primarily because they
all "involved remedies for clearly determined constitutional violations." 438 U.S. at 300.
Brennan disagreed strenuously. Id. at 362-66 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun,
JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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shall stand equal before the law^."^ "These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nati~nality."~~
"The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are i n v ~ l v e d . " ~
"Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are
classifica~
by their very nature odious to a free p e ~ p l e . ""Racial
tions are 'obviously irrelevant and invidious.' "" "At the very
least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the
'most rigid scrutiny.'
These statements are all dicta, but there were, after all, no
precedents for Bakke. The argument for preferential admissions
programs based on statements like the one from Rodriguez is
similarly an attempt to impute meaning to the equal protection
clause by examining cases interpreting it in other contexts. The
statements quoted above demonstrate that the Court has also
recognized another analytical strand: the state should treat all
persons without regard to their race.
Of course, even if the indicia of suspectness model does depart from the Court's historical view, it can reasonably be argued
that part of the role of the Supreme Court is to fashion new ways
of dealing with constitutional problems in order to accommodate
society's changing needs. The indicia of suspectness formula was,
however, not so fashioned. Indeed, Rodriguez, which set forth the
indicia, was not a race case at all, but a case dealing with an equal
protection challenge based on poverty. There the Court looked to
the race cases for a rationale to transplant into the poverty context. The three-prong test it finally set forth was not, however,
borrowed from the race cases, for they applied no such test. The
Rodriguez formulation merely described the groups that had re63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
N.R.R.,

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US. 81, 100 (1943).
Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U S . 683, 687 (1963) (quoting Steele v. Louisville &
323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944)).
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
69. Hence, it is not at all evident that "[tlhe case law is clear," as is argued by one
commentator. Baldwin, DeFunis v. Odegaard, The Supreme Court and Beferential Law
School Admissions: Discretion is Sometimes Not the Better Part of Valor, 27 U. F h . L.
REV.343, 360 (1975).
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ceived the protection of the equal protection clauses in the race
cases.
Although the Rodriguez formulation is often invoked without
e ~ p l a n a t i o nits
, ~ ~value as a threshold hurdle that the plaintiff
must surmount in order to obtain strict judicial scrutiny is not
self-evident. It is not self-evident, for example, why a plaintiff
who has been victimized by discriminatory state practices ought
to be required to show that his progenitors were similarly victimized. Nor is it evident why a plaintiff who can demonstrate he has
suffered a material harm as a result of state discrimination ought
to be required to demonstrate that he also suffered a psychological harm, such as stigmatization or stereotyping. Finally, it is not
evident why a plaintiff who has been denied a benefit on account
of his race ought also to be denied judicial redress simply because
he belongs to a group that does not generally lack political power.
The first two prongs of the test, historic discrimination and
stigmatization, are rarely defended at length. However, Professor
John Hart Ely has offered a reason for making membership in a
group that is politically powerless a prerequisite to full equal
p r o t e ~ t i o n Ely
. ~ ~ proposes that strict scrutiny should not apply
"[wlhen the group that controls the decision making process
classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself,"
since
[a] White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons
of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those of
others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative
classification that would extend to certain Whites the advantages generally extended to Blacks.72

Ely's point is thus twofold. First, strict scrutiny ought to apply
where the rulemaking body acts out of prejudice, underestimates
the needs of the racial group deprived of a benefit by the classification, or overestimates the costs of alternative classifications.
Second, rather than investigating those three factors each time
the Court is faced with a racial classification, the Court would be
justified in applying the majority-minority formulation, which is
70. 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d-34, 553-P2d
1152, 1183, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Broderick, supra note 31,
at 164-65; Willey, supra note 28, at 210-12; 28 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 238, 263 (1977).
71. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI.L. REV.
723 (1974).
72. Id. at 735.
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really a short-hand method for presuming the answers to the
three questions without further investigation. Ely's formulation
is not an argument explaining why only cases where one or more
of the three factors are present ought to be strictly scrutinized;
indeed, he assumes that proposition (although the Court has not).
Even if he is correct in his assumption, there is still some question
about the ability of the majority-minority rule to locate the offending classifications.
The majority-minority rule will work only if whites formulate
laws and policies with the view that they ought to be looking out
for other whites; if, in other words, the sympathies of white policymakers may be defined primarily in racial terms. Kent Greenawalt has indicated that that conclusion is not justified, a t least
in the law school setting. "As most law teachers have done very
well academically at the undergraduate level as well as in law
school," he writes, "they may have trouble identifying themselves
with marginal applicants." He goes on to say, "Many intellectuals [in and out of law schools] may actually find it easier to
identify with the plight of the 'oppressed' than the problems of
the 'Philistine' middle and lower middle classes."73Faculty members also will be likely to serve their own interests in minimizing
time spent in administering admissions programs." This faculty
interest may conflict with the interest of certain marginal white
applicants who might be benefited by a more time-consuming
"alternative classification that would extend to certain Whites
the advantages generally extended to B l a ~ k s . " ~ ~
Finally, the majority-minority prescription relies on the assumption that majority policymakers generally will share whatever burden the majority race is forced to bear. Sharing this burden will prevent the policymakers from overestimating the costs
of devising alternative classifications, which they would otherwise presumably be likely to do. Again, as Greenawalt has
pointed out, this assumption is questionable, a t least in the law
school setting: "Many law schools have strong preferences for the
children of faculty members, so teachers are . . . unlikely to
think of their own children as the potential victims of preferential
p o l i ~ i e s . "In
~ ~short, Professor Ely's proposal relies too heavily on
73. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 573-74.
74. Id. Greenawalt also adds: "Without doubt, some university programs for blacks,
though I think few admissions preferences, have been adopted after considerable pressure
that threatened or actually resulted in disruption." Id.
75. Ely, supra note 71, at 735.
76. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 573.
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unwarranted assumptions to establish the proposition that political powerlessness ought to be a prerequisite to the invocation of
the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Another major objection to the indicia of suspectness test is
that it makes a constitutional right depend upon membership in
a particular group,n shifting the focus of constitutional adjudica. ~ ~ Court
tion from individual rights to statistical c a t e g o r i e ~The
has traditionally maintained that equal protection is an individual right. "It is the individual . . who is entitled to the equal
protection of the laws-not merely a group of individuals, or a
body of persons according to their numbers."79 "The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its
~
rights established
terms, guaranteed to the i n d i v i d ~ a l . ""The
are personal rights? "[Tlhe guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment extend to persons. ""
On the other hand, the "group rights" theory has paved the
way for arguments such as Professor Robert O'Neil's:

.

Unlike employment quotas and school desegregation orders,
preferential policies in higher education do not include or exclude anyone solely on the basis of race. Members of the ethnic
majority will continue to fill most of the seats in college and
graduate school classrooms. The effect of increasing the number
of minority participants is not to bar any white applicant on the
basis of race, but only to reduce slightly the chances of whites
whose prospects would be marginal even without a minority
preference.=

It is impossible to see how the observation that "members of
the ethnic majority will continue to fill most of the seats" in the
Davis Medical School, for example, could lead to the conclusion
that Allan Bakke was not excluded "solely on the basis of race."
If Bakke was refused admission because of his race, it is unclear
what relevance the treatment of other whites might have on his
constitutional challenge. It might be argued that Bakke was not
excluded on account of his race, since he was free to compete for
the eighty-four seats available to whites. But this line of reason77. See Brief for Respondent at 31-36, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).
78. T. SOWELL,
AFFIRMATIVE
ACTIONRECONSIDERED
43 (1975).
79. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941).
80. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
81. Id.
82. 438 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added).
83. O'Neil, supra note 14, at 940.
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ing misses the crucial point that the constitutionally significant
question is not which seat he was denied, but why he was denied
it. It would be preposterous but equally logical to conclude that
if one black out of every thousand were forced to the back of the
bus, the nondiscriminatory treatment received by the other 999
would somehow neutralize this one instance of racial discrimination. As Justice Powell pointed out in Bakke, "The guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it
is not equal.""
Justice Powell noted a further difficulty with the concept of
group rights: determining which minority groups to recognize as
deserving preferential protection. He insisted that "[tlhere is no
principled basis for deciding which groups would merit
'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not."85In trying
to make such a decision, the Court would face a number of thorny
sociological problems. What degree of discrimination must a minority group suffer before a racial classification that disadvantages it can be characterized as "invidious"? How are prejudice
and discrimination measured? May a group lose its preferred
status as the impact of preferential programs begins to be felt?
May a group regain that status once it is lost? The analysis necessary to deal adequately with such questions does not, Justice
Powell concluded, "lie within the judicial competence.""
2. The legislative history

A second theory supporting the preferential view argues that
the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment justifies preferring blacks over whites in state university admissions." In
1868, the argument goes, whites had no need of special amendments to secure their rights to equal protection of the laws. But
blacks, because of their previous condition of servitude, were in
special need of the amendment to secure their civil rights. Therefore, although the equal protection clause does not actually mention blacks, they are the special interest of that clause. As Justice
84. 438 U.S. at 289-90.

85. Id. at 296.
86. Id. at 297.
87. "It is plain that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to prohibit measures designed to remedy the effects of the Nation's past treatment of Negroes." 438 U.S.
at 396-97 (Marshall, J., separate opinion).
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Miller wrote in the Slaughter-House Casess8in 1873:
On the most casual examination of the language of [the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth] amendments, no one can fail
to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of
them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen
from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.89

To argue that the fourteenth amendment today ought to protect
whites even when doing so works to the disadvantage of its original beneficiaries is thus said to "stand the equal protection clause
on its head."90
Alexander Bickel has demonstrated that section 1of the fourteenth amendment "carried out the relatively narrow objectives
of the Moderates, and hence, as originally understood, was meant
to apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation."" In fact, a specific formulation
of civil rights (including desegregation) would almost certainly
have failed adoption.92The purpose of the fourteenth amendment
~~
was, in Sandalow's words, "[flreedom, not e q ~ a l i t y . "Raoul
Berger adds that racism and fierce opposition to social and political equality were widespread in the North as well as the South,
infecting the amendment's supporters as well as its opponents."
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the framers intended the fourteenth amendment to protect, in addition to
newly freed slaves, southern whites who, because of their sympathy with the Union, were in danger of discriminatory treatment
a t the hands of the southern state legislature^.^^ In short, the idea
that blacks should be given preferential treatment in state uni88. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
89. Id. a t 71.
90. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An
Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343, 357 (1974).
91. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAW. L.
REV.1, 58 (1955).
92. Id. at 61-62.
93. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 665. The amendment was designed merely to incorpoGOVERNrate into the Constitution the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. R. BERGER,
MENT BY JUDICIARY
166-92 (1977).
supra note 93, a t 12-16, 27-36.
94. R. BERGER,
95. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Preferential Minority Admissions Programs in State Professional Schools, 45 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 343, 353 & nn. 47-51 (1977).
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versities would have struck the amendment's framers as
"bizarre"96 if not incon~eivable.~~
On the other hand, Justice Marshall argued in Bakke that
the Congress of 1868 was indeed willing to see the interests and
rights of whites subordinated to those of the newly freed slaves.
He observed that the same Congress that passed the fourteenth
amendment also passed the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act,
an act that provided many of its benefits only to Negroes. . . .
Although the Freedmen's Bureau legislation provided aid for
refugees, thereby including white persons within some of the
relief measures, . . . the bill was regarded, to the dismay of
many Congressmen, as "solely and entirely for the freedmen,
and to the exclusion of all other persons."B8

And even though the bill was attacked on the ground that it gave
blacks special treatment unavailable to many whites, Congress
overrode President Johnson's veto to make it law. However, the
Freedman's Bureau Act was not designed to benefit succeeding
generations of blacks or, as Justice Marshall seems to imply in
some passages, blacks generally;" its primary purpose was to aid
newly freed slaves in their extraordinarily difficult transition
from slavery to freedom.
Justice Marshall concluded that the "intent of the Framers"
was to achieve "genuine equality" rather than merely "abstract
equality."loOHe apparently used the term "abstract equality" to
refer to legal equality, and the term "genuine equality" to refer
to social, financial, educational, and occupational equality. In
view of the formidable evidence to the contrary, which Justice
Marshall does not acknowledge,lo1the legislative history of a single limited legislative enactment cannot justify the conclusion
that the 1868 Congress intended the fourteenth amendment to
achieve such extra-legal equality. The most that can consistently
be said of those who enacted the fourteenth amendment was that
they intended it to allow, rather than achieve, such equality.
96. Posner, supra note 23, at 21.
97. Bickel theorized that the wording of the equal protection clause was intended by
the Radicals to be sufficiently ambiguous to allow for future manipulation of the clause.
BRANCH
63 (1962). For an analysis of that hypothesis,
A. BICKEL,THE LEAST DANGEROUS
see R. BERGER,
supra note 93, a t 99-116.
98. 438 US. at 397 (Marshall, J., separate opinion) (citations omitted).
99. See id. at 398.
100. Id.
101. Indeed, the portion of the Marshall opinion which claims to look a t the history
of the fourteenth amendment does not even refer to that history; it is devoted exclusively
to the history of the Freemen's Bureau Act. Id. at 397-98.
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There is also a loosely constructed argument that looks not
a t the framers' intent, but only a t its direction. Since the framers
moved toward extending greater legal benefits to blacks,lo2the
argument runs, all further extentions of benefits are historically
justifiable. This position is problematical for two reasons. First,
it requires a court to claim historical sanction for an opinion that
would never have been approved by those historical figuqes to
whom the court looks for support. The difficulty is not dispelled
by the insistence that the Court would only be harvesting the
fruit of the seed first planted by the framers. On what ground can
the framers' desire to move in a particular direction be consistently taken more seriously than their desire not to move any
further in that direction? One ground might be that society has
moved farther in that direction than the framers were willing to
move. That explanation may be justifiable, but it is not historical, and should not be accorded the weight that an appeal to
legislative history provides.
A second basic problem with this contention is that it provides no fixed limits on the exercise of judicial discretion. Thus,
such a rule of interpretation suggests no logical stopping point
beyond which the Court must not push the "intent" of the framers. The Court is no longer required to ask what the legislative
history dictates, but only what it allows. And by taking the quasihistorical view that it allows any state action that benefits blacks,
the Court can insulate itself from genuinely historical objections.
The effect is to shroud an utterly unhistorical view with apparent
historical legitimacy while dismissing the truly historical view as
unhistorical.

The Symmetrical View: Equal Protection for All Races
A third view of the equal protection clause, which might be
referred to as the "symmetrical view," dictates that all governmental practices that discriminate on the basis of race be subject
to "the most rigid scrutiny."lo3 Such practices can be permitted
only if they can be shown to further a "compelling state interest"
and then only if no less restrictive alternative is available.lo4The
essential difference between this view of equal protection and the
preferential view is that the symmetrical view insists that all
C.

-

102. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 570-71.
103. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.214 (1944).
104. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
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types of racial discrimination are equally repugnant to the Constitution, and hence that all racial classifications are equally suspect.
For nearly a century, landmark opinions have maintained
that the equal protection clause prohibits all discriminatory
treatment on account of race.lo5It does not, according to those
decisions, favor particular racial or ethnic groups and give only
limited protection to all others. In fact, not until the last decade
has anyone suggested that equal protection might have one-way
application in the sense that only classifications affecting certain
racial groups are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The one-way
application attracted support only after it became apparent that
the clause might operate to the detriment of minorities by curtailing affirmative action programs. This hasty reinterpretation of
the clause has left minority rights advocates vulnerable to the
criticism described by John Rawls:
It is not, however, an unnatural extension of the duty of fair play
to have it include the obligation which participants who have
knowingly accepted the benefits of their common practice owe
to each other to act in accordance with it when their performance falls due; for it is usually considered unfair if someone
accepts the benefits of a practice but refuses to do his part in
maintaining it .Iw

The principle a t stake was succinctly stated by Chaim Perelman: "If the judge violates the rules of concrete justice he has
himself accepted, then he is unjust."lo7 Rawls makes a similar
point: "[Hlaving a morality is analogous to having made a firm
commitment in advance; for one must acknowledge the principles
of morality even when to one's disadvantage. A man whose moral
judgments always coincided with his interests could be suspected
of having no morality a t
This definition of morality seems
to require that minorities acknowledge the principle of law on
which they have based previous claims, even when doing so is to
their disadvantage.
Consequently, the suggestion that the Court should approve
benign racial discrimination has aroused moral indignation from
many diverse camps, lW including minorities. 'lo Even advocates of
p

p

-

-

-

-

-

105. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra.
106. Rawls, supra note 20, at 180, reprinted in H. BEDAU,
supra note 20, at 90.
107. C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE
AND THE PROBLEM
OF ARGUMENT
20 (1963).
supra note 20, at 84.
108. Rawls, supra note 20, at 173, reprinted in H. BEDAU,
109. See, e.g., Cohen, The DeFunis Case: Race and the Constitution, THENATION,
Feb. 1975, at 135; Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School,

50

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

such discrimination are not oblivious to its potential for causing
d i s ~ o m f o r tThere
. ~ ~ ~ is good reason for such discomfort. Advocates
of preferential programs are demanding that Americans unlearn
in the 1970's the moral lesson that was thrust upon them in the
1960's. An arduous struggle, reflected in marches, songs, rallies,
stickers, movies, and freedom rides, brought legislation and culminated finally in the concession of the American nation, that
race should be a legally neutral fact. The moral force of this
proposition was irresistible. The watchcry of "equal opportunity"
in great measure mobilized the hearts and minds of Americans,
and rightly so. The principle of racial neutrality is one that comports with a priori notions of equal justice. As Professor Carl
Cohen has written: "Whenever individuals i r e penalized solely
because they manifest some adventitious characteristic wholly
out of their control-their skin color, their national origin, or the
like-the unfairness arouses strong indignation. Our viscera do
not mislead us in this; any reasonable standard would certainly
H.L.A. Hart comes
exclude such uses of racial ~lassification."~~~
to a similar conclusion in The Concept of Law:
119 PA.L. REV.351,353,356 (1970); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality
for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 380 (1966);
~avinsky,A Moment of Truth i n ~ a c i a lBased
l ~ Admissions, 3 HASTINGS
CONST.L.Q.879,
881 (1976); Perhacs, But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: A Look a t the
Equal Protection Argument Against Minority Preferences, 12 DUQ.L. REV. 580,600 (1974);
Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimimtion: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 854 (1967).
110. See, e.g., McPherson, The Black Law Student: A Boblem of Fidelities, THE
ATLANTIC,
Apr. 1975, at 93,100; Sowell, Are Quotas Good for Blacks?, COMMENTARY,
June
1978, at 39.
Public-opinion polls have repeatedly shown most blacks opposed to preferential
treatment either in jobs or college admissions. A Gallup Poll in March 1977, for
example, found only 27 percent of non-whites favoring "preferential treatment"
over "ability as determined by test scores," while 64 percent preferred the latter
and 9 percent were undecided. (The Gallup breakdown of the U.S. population
by race, sex, income, education, etc. found that "not a single population group
supports affirmative action.")
Id.
111. For example, Professor Sandalow has commented:
[Rlacial and ethnic preferences do involve serious dangers. In the end, however, a decision concerning their validity cannot avoid a judgment about
whether they are likely to contribute to or retard development of the kind of
society we want. In my own judgment, for reasons already explained, the former
is more likely. It would be foolish to assert that judgment c o n f i d e n t ~ y ; ~ e -r-.
If the potential benefits are great, so too are the potential losses. But in the light
of the seriousness of America's racial problem, the risk seems worth taking,
however uncomfortable we may be with it.
Sandalow, supra note 17, at 703.
112. Cohen, supra note 109, at 141.
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Indeed so deeply embedded in modern man is the principle that
prima facie human beings are entitled to be treated alike that
almost universally where the laws do discriminate by deference
to such matters as colour and race, lip service a t least is still
widely paid to this principle. If such discriminations are attacked they are often defended by the assertion that the class
discriminated against lack, or have not yet developed, certain
essential human attributes; or it may be said that, regrettable
though it is, the demands of justice requiring their equal treatment must be overridden in order to preserve something held to
be of greater value, which would be jeopardized if such discriminations were not made.u3

Alexander Bickel has observed:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the
lesson of contemporary history have been the same for a t least
a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a
matter of whose ox is gored.li4

In accordance with this fundamental principle minorities have
rightfully demanded protection from governmental discrimination, citing the equal protection clause for the proposition that no
one should be denied a governmental benefit or suffer a governmentally imposed penalty because of his race. No special prophetic powers are needed to predict that when it is argued that
whites suffering similar governmental discrimination cannot
avail themselves of similar protection, the demand for an explanation will be vigorous if not indignant.l15As stated by the Califor113. H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 158 (1961).
114. A. BICKEL,THE M o m OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
115. Such reaction has not been limited to academic circles:
The New York Times recently published an editorial endorsement of the reverse
discrimination that caused the rejection of Allan Bakke by the medical school
of the University of California a t Davis. Two weeks later, the New York Times
turned over the whole of its editorial page to spirited discussions of that stand,
introduced by an editorial statement that, by a ratio of 15 to 1, the Times'
readers rejected the Times' logic.
REVIEW,
Aug. 5, 1977, at 904.
Buckley, Are We All Conservatives Now?, NATIONAL
Most Americans oppose granting preferential treatment to minorities and
women in getting jobs or entering college, according to a recent Gallup Poll.
The survey found that, despite claims of past and present discrimination,
81 percent of those questioned felt that ability as measured by test scores should
be the main consideration in hiring and admitting people to schools. Only 11
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nia Supreme Court, preferential admissions "represent a retreat
in the struggle to assure that each man and woman shall be
judged on the basis of individual merit alone, a struggle which has
only lately achieved success in removing legal barriers to racial
e q ~ a l i t y . " ~ ~ ~ m e r i remember
cans
their earlier lesson well enough
to sense "a certain irony in climaxing a long struggle in the name
of equality by demanding inequality. " l7
Of the three views of the equal protection clause-the utilitarian, the preferential, and the symmetrical-the one best supported by fundamental principles of fairness as well as the legacy
of the Court's pronouncements is the third. But merely adopting
the symmetrical view does not automatically dispose of the preferential admissions question. This view does not forbid all racial
discrimination. It simply requires that the Court apply its strictest standard of review. The strict scrutiny standard requires that
the state's racial classification, to survive judicial review, be necessary to serve a compelling state interest. 118 Further inquiry must
therefore focus on whether or not the interests served by preferential admissions programs are sufficiently compelling to justify an
exception to the general rule forbidding classifications based on
race.
percent favored preferential treatment, and 8 percent had no opinion.
REPORT,Dec. 5, 1977, at 24.
U.S. NEWS& WORLD
116. BaMre v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 62-63, 553 P.2d 1152, 1171,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 699 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
117. Kaplan, supra note 109, at 364. On the other hand, there is an argument that
any action taken to eradicate the effects of historical discrimination is moral. Nathan
Glazer, for example, contends that "any claim for blacks (and in lesser degree for other
AFFIRMATIVE
minorities) has an immediate moral force and justification." N. GLAZER,
DISCRIMINATION:
ETHNIC
INEQUALITY AND PUBLICPOLICY
207 (1978). While recognizing that
hard affirmative action measures "could not get the support of Congress today on a
straight vote, and would certainly not get the support of the majority of the American
people if asked," Glazer insists that "[tlhey are seen as moral." Id. at 210. He further
suggests that much of the moral weight of affirmative action programs is accorded them
by those who "do not want to find themselves in the posture of the South." Id. at 209. I f
he is right, what he calls moral support would be more accurately described as a fear of
being unfairly accused of racism, a risk all nonracists run when they support, for moral
or legal reasons, positions that are supported by racists for racist reasons. The risk is real.
See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 31, a t 175. See also Seeburger, A Heuristic Argument
Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 285 (1977).
118. "It should be noted that 'compelling state interest' in this instance is not synonymous with the general recognition of an important social goal, but rather, with that degree
of importance which would justify overcoming our traditional abhorrence of racial discrimination." Brief for Respondent a t 55, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).
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111. STATE
INTERESTSIN PREFERENTIAL
ADMISSIONS
From the time the Court first applied a heightened scrutiny
to racial classifications, national survival is the only example of
interest so vital that the Court has labeled it ompe pel ling."^^^
Korematsu v. United States120 the Court stated:
[A111 legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can. 12'
119. As noted in the brief for Allan Bakke:
This Court has found a basis for sanctioning racial discrimination in only two
cases. In Korematsu v. United States, and in Hirabayashi u. United States, . . .
the Court upheld military exclusion and curfew orders directed against American citizens of Japanese origin. In view of the widespread criticism of these
cases, it is not clear that even the threat of invasion, espionage, and sabotage
would justify these racially discriminatory orders were they to be reviewed by a
present-day court.
Brief for Respondent at 55 & n.52. See also Greenawalt, supra note 29, a t 567; Renfrew,
supra note 12, at 605.
In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Court upheld the practice of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs of hiring Indians whenever possible. In doing so, however, the
Court made clear that the case was sui generis because of the "unique legal status of
Indians" as well as the "plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of
Indians . . drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself." Id. at 55152. The Court emphasized that the BIA's practice was not in fact racial discrimination a t
all and that the case was not to be considered a precedent to justify future exceptions to
the constitutional ban on racial discrimination:
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this preference does not
constitute "racial discrimination." Indeed, it is not even a "racial" preference.
Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause
of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of
its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the
governing agency. The preference is similar in kind to the Constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be "an inhabitant of that
State for which he shall be chosen," Art. I, 8 3, cl. 3, or that a member of a city
council reside within the city governed by the council. Congress has sought only
to enable the BIA to draw more heavily from among the constituent groups in
staffing its projects, all of which, either directly or indirectly, affect the lives
of tribal Indians. The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities
whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion . . . .
In the sense that there is no other group of people favored in this manner, the
legal status of the BIA is truly sui generis.
Id. at 553-54. Morton v. Mancari is therefore not a suitable guide to the meaning of' the
term "compelling state interest."
120. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
121. Id. a t 216.
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The Court continued:
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and
peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.
But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.122

Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Hirabayashi v.
United States,123made it clear that as far as the Court was concerned, "[tlhe threat of Japanese invasion of the west coast was
not fanciful but
and that "national survival [was] at
stake."125These cases established a very rigid standard which was
not met by any racial classification from World War I1 until
Bakke.
Advocates of preferential admissions have advanced four
major interests that such programs are designed to serve: (1)the
need to compensate for historical mistreatment of minorities, (2)
the need for professional services among minorities, (3) the need
for racial proportionality, and (4) the need for student body diversity. None of these objectives is without some justification; certainly none is advanced frivolously. Most commentators who advance them do so out of concern for members of minority races
and for the nation as a whole. The objectives cannot, therefore,
be frivolously dismissed, but neither ought they be allowed to
neutralize a recognized constitutional right without being subjected to the closest examination. The right to equal protection
of the laws may not be lightly overridden. The right to be treated
without regard to one's race is precious and should only be denied
in deference to a countervailing interest that is truly compelling. 1 2 ~

A.

Compensating for Historical Mistreatment of Minorities

Perhaps the argument that has most captivated scholars,
practitioners, and laymen alike is that preferential admission
programs are needed to compensate minorities for mistreatment
122. Id. at 219-20.
123. 320 U.S.81 (1943).
124. Id. at 105 (Douglas, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 106.
126. It has been argued that the compelling state interest test represents a standard
too high for benign discrimination cases, and that some intermediate standard ought
therefore to be applied. See note 29 and accompanying text supra. The discussion in the
text is relevant both to strict scrutiny and to any intermediate standard.
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they have received at the hands of whites throughout the nation's
history. The general idea is that "preferential programs are a
form of compensation, or reparations, to repay these minority
groups for the harm inflicted upon them in the past by society
and to compensate them for the benefits which nonminorities
have reaped as. a result of the deprivations suffered by minorities."ln This statement emphasizes one strand of the compensation argument, namely, that whites owe a debt to minorities because whites have unjustly benefited by mistreating minorities.
The other strand of the argument is typified by the allegation
that as a result of discrimination minorities are poorly equipped
to compete on an equal basis, and therefore "evenhanded treatment cannot yield equal results."128Professor John Kaplan has
graphically depicted the argument:
The treatment-according-to-need argument often uses the
analogy of a foot-race in which one of the runners has been
shackled for the entire time. We could not simply remove his
chains and let the race continue. Not only would he then be far
behind in the race, but also, from want of exercise and various
other disabilities, he would be much less able to contin~e.'~"

In another statement, Professor Kaplan aptly expresses both
strands of the argument:
[Slince our white society has enslaved and exploited the
Negro, leaving him in far worse condition to compete in and
enjoy the benefits of our society, it is only fair that each victim
of this wrong be compensated for his injuries-whether or not
he is presently in need. This is especially so, the argument goes,
since the white society which damaged the Negro has been unjustly enriched by benefiting from slavery and cheap Negro
labor. In addition, over and above the measurable financial loss
inflicted, compensation may be claimed for pain, suffering and
humiliation. There has, indeed, been some precedent for the
recognition of this type of obligation. We have sought to compensate American Indians for lands taken away from their
ancestors and, though to some the comparison may be odious,
the West German government has paid millions of dollars to
Israel in reparation for Nazi crimes against Jews. This repayment of a debt theory avoids the thorny issue of the correspondence between color and need. Under this view, "the professional
127. Redish, supra note 90, at 379.
128. Cohen, supra note 109, at 135.
129. Kaplan, supra note 109, at 365.
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Negro, the Negro businessman, and those able to climb the
ladder despite their handicaps would each be much further
along than they are if it were not for the immoral practices of
the white society," and hence are legitimate objects of compensation.'"

While the redressing of past injustices has an emotional appeal, the position is not without its difficulties. For example,
Karst and Horowitz have pointed out a major problem with the
compensation theory as it is applied in employment cases. Their
observation is appropriate to the educational context as well:
Not only are the beneficiaries of today's preferential quota normally not the actual victims of yesterday's discrimination by
employer or union; it is also difficult to determine whether they
have been affected even indirectly by the past practices of the
employer or union in question. On the other side, those who are
disadvantaged by today's preferential quota normally have not
been responsible for the past discrimination, and have not profited from it. Affirmative action cannot be "compensatory" or
"remedial" except in the most diffuse sense.131

Karst and Horowitz focus on two different concerns. First, do
preferential programs benefit the right people? Second, do preferential programs disadvantage the right people?
Justice Marshall, in Bakke, addressed the first concern by
insisting that "[ilt is unnecessary in 20th century America to
have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims
of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so
pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact."132His comment is an answer to the
objection that the class benefited by today's preferential programs is too broad. Since no black has escaped the effects of
discrimination, no black can be said to be unjustly benefited by
compensatory programs.
There is, of course, another objection: the class benefited by
today's preferential programs is too narrow. Nonblack Americans
have also suffered discrimination. And, as Posner has observed,
"when race is used as a proxy for characteristics thought to be
130. Id. at 365-67 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Morcuse, in EQUALITY
149 (1965)).
131. Karst and Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, GO-VA,L~REV.
955, 964-65 (1974). See also Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A
L. REV. 534, 538-39 (1975); Posner, supra note 23,
Jurisprudential roach; 75 COLUM.
at 16.
132. 438 US. at 400 (Marshall, J., separate opinion).
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relevant to the educational experience, discrimination against
people who .have the characteristics (of poverty, cultural handicaps, etc.) but not the racial identity, results."133His point is this:
the intention never was to prefer minorities merely because they
were minorities, but to prefer those who have suffered the effects
of discrimination. Minority status per se is used as a basis for
preference only because there is thought to be a high correlation
between the class of all minorities and the class of all discrimination victims.lu However, this approach to identifying discrimination victims necessarily denies many actual victims the benefit
of preferential treatment merely because their racial, ethnic, or
religious status does not entitle them to official compensation.
Furthermore, there are many other persons who, although not the
victims of racial or ethnic prejudices, are similarly disadvantaged
by circumstances largely beyond their control.
A just solution might therefore be to prefer applicants of any
race who can demonstrate that they have suffered the effects of
discrimination or who are otherwise disadvantaged.'" A typical
response to this suggestion is that if preferences are accorded on
the basis of disadvantage rather than race, too few minorities will
be admitted to professional schools.136
This objection is valid only if some compelling interest in
preferring minorities for a reason other than historical disadvantage, such as promoting student body diversity, exists. If such an
independent compelling interest were recognized, and if the number of minorities admitted under a program based on disadvantage were significantly lower than under the present system of
133. Posner, supra note 23, at 14.
134. Nickel, supra note 131, at 550-51. Professor Nickel suggests a framework for
analyzing preferential policies by building flexibility into the correlative scheme. Id. a t
555-58.
135. It appears that no schools to date have experimented with preferential programs
based on disadvantage. Lavinsky, supra note 109, a t 880. However, "[o]fficials of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Mexican-American Legal Defense
Fund have acknowledged that they 'could live with' a program based on disadvantage."
Id. a t 889 (footnote omitted).
136. Justice Tobriner, dissenting from the California Supreme Court's decision in
Bakke, noted:
Because all disadvantaged students need financial aid, the total number of such
students a medical school can afford to admit is limited. As a consequence,
inclusion of all disadvantaged students in the special admission program would
inevitably decrease the number of minority students admitted under the program and thus curtail the achievement of all integration-related objectives.
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 90, 553 P.2d 1152, 1190, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680, 718 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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racial preferences, the program would be vulnerable to the criticism that it was ineffective in serving the recognized state interest.'" If, on the other hand, it is the disadvantaged status of
minorities that is being advanced as the compelling state interest, preferential programs based on disadvantage would not be
vulnerable to the criticism that they benefited nonminorities as
much or more than minorities.
In Bakke, Justice Powell dealt with the issue of whether beneficiaries of preferential treatment must demonstrate previous
disadvantage by pointing out that the Court has always required
a t least a showing of illegal discrimination on the part of the
employer or school before it would sanction preferential programs. He wrote: "After such findings have been made, . . . the
legal rights of the victims must be vindicated."138To allow remedial programs to compensate for "societal discrimination" would
unduly jeopardize the rights of those who are disadvantaged by
such programs. For, as Justice Powell also observed, "there is a
measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons . . . to bear the
burdens of redressing grievances not of their making. "1 3 ~
Greenawalt has proposed a plausible answer to this challenge. It is reasonable to assume, he suggests, that if no discrimination had ever occurred, many more blacks would qualify for
admission without the benefit of special preference. Borderline
whites who are accepted to schools without preferential admissions policies are therefore the unwitting beneficiaries of others'
discriminations, even if they are innocent of discrimination themselves. To adopt a preferential policy that excludes them is
merely to place them "in the position they would have been in if
Strictly speaking, howthe discrimination had never oc~ured."l*~
ever, this argument does not answer Justice Powell's objection.
What Greenawalt proposes is an allocation of the burdens of compensation upon the beneficiaries of the wrongdoing rather than
upon the perpetrators of the wrongs; he does not demonstrate
that that alternative is fairer than the traditional method of allocation. There are also additional difficulties with the "unwitting
beneficiary" theory which become evident when it is applied hypothetically in other contexts. Should white students' grades be
137. O'Neil, After DeFunis: Filling the Constitutional Vacuum, 27 U . FLA.L. REV.
315, 341; Sandalow, supra note 17, at 690.
138. 438 U.S.at 307.
139. Id. at 298.
140. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 585.
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discounted on the assumption that the discounted grades are the
ones they would have received absent discrimination? Ought
law school class standings be rearranged to reflect what they
presumably would have been absent discrimination? Should
white attorneys, when opposing black attorneys, be held to a
higher standard of proof than their opponents on the assumption that, absent discrimination, black attorneys would be better
qualified and hence more likely to persuade the court? These
examples are more extreme than the preferential admissions
situation, but they are equally well supported by the "unwitting
beneficiary" theory.
There is a further theoretical pitfall in forcing today's nonminority students to bear the burden of compensating for historical
discrimination. In his Bakke opinion, Justice Marshall observed
cryptically that until 1954, "ours was a Nation where, by law, an
individual could be given 'special' treatment based on the color
of his skin."141 The observation is crucial: acts of discrimination
committed before 1954 were legal.142Those who committed discriminatory acts behaved well within their constitutional rights
as set forth by the Supreme Court. For today's Court to sanction
a governmental agency's attempts to redress "several hundred
years of class-based discrimination against Negroes"143would
thus require it to permit penalization of nonminorities for actions
which, a t the time they were committed, were admittedly legal.
The court has scrupulously observed this distinction between
legal and illegal discrimination in applying the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. MoodylU the Court observed:
"[Ulnder Title W backpay liability exists only for practices
occuring after the effective date of the Act . . . . Thus no award
was possible with regard to the plant's pre-1964 policy of 'strict
segregation.' "14s The limitation that pertains to backpay awards
pertains also to awards of retroactive seniority. Although Justice
Marshall strenuously objected, the Court ruled in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters u. United States that "employees who
suffered only pre-Act discrimination are not entitled to relief, and
141. 438 U.S. at 401 (Marshall, J., separate opinion).
142. Segregation was legal in public schools, of course, until Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Most discrimination by private institutions is now prohibited by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 247 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
143. 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., separate opinion).
144. 422 U S . 405 (1975).
145. Id. at 410 n.3.
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no person may be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than
the effective date of the Act."146
Ironically, there is also reason to believe that racially preferential programs in fact stigmatize the very minority applicants
they are designed to benefit, including those who would have
been admitted to the school without preferential ~0nsideration.l~~
Justice Douglas recognized this problem in his DeFunis dissent:
A segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma
and caste no less than a segregated classroom, and in the end it
may produce that result despite its contrary intentions. One
other assumption must be clearly disapproved: that blacks or
browns cannot make it on their individual merit. That is a
stamp of inferiority that a State is not permitted to place on any
lawyer.lM

One black law student has written: "[Mlaking the student feel
special, placing him in a category which takes intellectual limitations for granted at the start of the ordeal, only makes his struggle
that much harder, that much more painful."149Dr. Thomas Sowell, himself a black, has pronounced this indictment of the preferential admissions system:
Bending a few rules here and there to get the right body count
of minority students seems a small price to pay for maintaining
an image that will keep money coming in from the government
and the foundations. When a few thousand dollars in financial
aid to students can keep millions of tax dollars rolling in, it is
clearly a profitable investment for the institution. For the young
people brought in under false pretense, it can turn out to be a
disastrous and permanently scarring experience.150
146. 431 U.S. 324, 356-57 (1977).
147. See Project, Referential Admissions to Professional Schools: The E q w l Protection Challenge, 22 VILL. L. REV. 983, 1009 (1977).
In an article in the opinion-editorial section of the New York Times, David L.
Evans, Senior Admissions Officer of Harvard, complained: "So much has been
written about the illegitimacy of special recruiting efforts for minority students,
black students' dissillusionment and 'reverse discrimination' that the mere
presence of blacks at selective institutions has more and more begun to imply
substandard credentials." He added:"Black students who come to Harvard far
too often receive the coolest, most ambivalent reception given to any upwardlymobile ethnic group that has ever entered these ivied walls." N.Y. TIMES, NOV.
24, 1976, a t 33, col. 1.
Lavinsky, supra note 109, a t 889 n.57.
148. 416 U.S.a t 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
149. McPherson, supm note 110, at 100.
150. Sowell, supm note 110, at 41.
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Professor Lino Graglia has indicated that the problem has been
compounded:
Some schools have in fact abandoned the factual premise on
which the programs were originally based and no longer insist
on undiluted performance standards-lower standards are now
justifiable. At New York University Law School, for example, a
special admission program was first adopted in 1966 when the
school employed an anonymous grading procedure under which
the identity of the student was not known to the professor until
after the grade was assigned. After two years, twelve of fifteen
specially admitted students were not maintaining a passing average. A faculty committee reporting on the problem found that
the special admission program was being "crippled by the rigidity of the anonymous grading system" and that "(t)he preservation inviolate of traditionally narrow canons of academic excellence recedes into insignificance when confronted with the dimensions of the American crisis of social injustice." It successfully recommended that the grading system be changed to permit a professor to take into account special admission when a
student would otherwise receive a failing grade.I5l

Again, it is not only preferred applicants who suffer the
stigma, but all minority professionals. For example, both the
minority applicant who would have been admitted to medical
school without preferential treatment and the minority student
a t a medical school which has no preferential admission program
may, despite excellent qualifications as practicing physicians, be
suspected of being less qualified than their white counterparts.152
In short, "one of the most serious disservices done by lowered
academic standards for Negroes in institutions of higher learning
is to call into question the legitimacy of every Negro graduate."lJ3
As Justice Powell noted in Bakke, "preferential programs may
only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups
are unable to achieve success without special protection based on
a factor having no relationship to individual worth."lJ4
Another reason why preferential programs are likely to frustrate the interests of minorities is that "by making different rules
for the white and the Negro [the government] can only increase
the importance of race in our already race-ridden society."lJ5Pro151. Graglia, supra note 109, at 359-60 (footnotes omitted).
152. See Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 571-72.
153. Graglia, supra note 109, a t 356.
154. 438 US. at 298.
155. Kaplan, supra note 109, at 380.
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fessor Ralph Winter has observed:
In any event, preferential programs are fundamentally
countereducative on the basic issue of racial discrimination itself. Instead of helping to eliminate race from politics, they
inject it. Instead of teaching tolerance and helping those forces
seeking accommodation, they divide on a racial basis. Such programs tend to legitimate the back-lash by providing it with
much of the philosophical and moral base from which the civil
rights movement itself began. And, indeed, there is no reason
to believe that if racial issues become more, rather than less, of
a political issue, Neroes will be the winners.156

Professor Graglia has pointed out yet another disservice a
university may do to minorities by holding out the promise of a
quality product a t a discounted price: "Inadequate grade school,
high school, and college educational opportunities cannot be redressed by offering quality law school education. In quality education it is not possible to begin a t the top."15' The flaw in the
program that Graglia focuses on is merely one manifestation of
something far more pervasive and more counterproductive: the
insistence that problems be solved on the level of the symptoms
rather than at the roots. Rather than preparing minority students
to really compete in the admissions program, admission standards are changed; rather than helping minority students to learn
the law more thoroughly, the grading system is changed. It has
even been suggested that rather than helping minorities pass the
bar exam, the test should be changed.15sIn short, concentration
is placed not on making minority students professionals in the
fullest sense of that word, but on making them professionals, if
only in name.

B. &ofessional Services Among Minority Groups
One of the more serious medical problems facing the country
is the inadequacy of medical services in poor minority neighborhoods. Data indicating a high incidence of many serious diseases
among blacks1" may reflect a significant lack of available medical
care. This scarcity of medical care is arguably caused by the
shortage of practicing minority doctors. For example, the physi156. Winter, supra note 109, at 854. See also Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 571.
157. Graglia, supra note 109, at 353.
158. See, e.g., Antonides, Minorities and the Bar Exam: Color Them Angry, JURIS
Docro~,Aug./Sept. 1978, at 56.
159. Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
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cianlnonphysician ratio in the population generally is about
seven times greater than the same ratio among blacks. The situation for Chicanos and American Indians-for whom similar data
are unavailable-is thought to be even worse.lN
In Bakke the University of California did not argue that only
blacks can treat blacks, but simply that they are more likely to
do so:
To suggest that the paucity of minority physicians is reflected in poor medical care for minorities is not to suggest that
only blacks can treat blacks or that only Asians should treat
Asians . . . . It is simply to recognize the reality that many
forces, including economics, idealism, and continuing patterns
of discrimination, commonly bring minority physicians back
into minority communities, where the shortage of health services is most severe, and that as a society we have refrained from
compelling other physicians to locate their practices in those
areas.
"If you could insist, for instance, that the people
who come into the professional school make a contract
for 10 to 20 year terms to serve low-income people, then
you would have no need to be racially selective. But the
fact of the matter is you could neither make nor enforce
such a contract."161

Although the University asserted that "many forces . . . commonly bring minority physicians back into minority communities,"162the only evidence cited in its brief in support of that
contention is the following statement: "There are data showing
that doctors of non-racial ethnic groups (Anglo-Saxon, Irish, Italian, Jewish, and Polish) tend to 'specialize in serving their fellowethnics.' 'w3 And although all the minority students participating
in a preferential program may express an interest in practicing in
disadvantaged ethnic communities, there are no guarantees that
the students will ultimately practice in such c o m m u n i t i e ~If
.~~
the concern is truly with the medical services available to those
who need it most-there seems to be no necessity for defining
need in terms of race-those services can be virtually assured
without reference to race, without constitutional infringement,
160. Id. at 23.
161. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Jenkins, The Howard Professional School in a New Social
Perspective, 62 J. NAT'LMED. A. 167 (1970)).
162. Id. at 25.
163. Id. at 25 & n.24.
164. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34,56,553 P.2d 1152,1167,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 695. (1976).
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and without compelling anyone to do anything. The state could
specify certain schools, or certain seats at certain schools, as
available only to students who agree to "be bound-even as students a t West Point are bound to spend time in the army-to
spend time in the ghettos."165
Likewise, rather than merely hoping that minority doctors
will answer the needs of underserviced communities-and this
a t the price of curtailing a recognized constitutional rightincreased medical services in such communities could be ensured by having the states contract with medical students to
practice in underserviced communities in exchange for free medical education. The University of California insisted that "you
While it might
could neither make nor enforce such contracts."1B6
be impossible to compel the graduate's performance, the state
could a t least make breach sufficiently unattractive by demanding damages and preventing the breaching graduate from practicing elsewhere.la7
Delivery of legal services presents a similar problem: "All
should recognize that the current shortage of Negro attorneys has
reached crisis proportions. Whatever one's view of ultimate objectives, it is clear that for the present more Negro attorneys must
be trained as quickly as quality preparation permits."lB8In addition, there has been a heavier emphasis in the area of the law to
insist on the need for lawyers from ethnic minorities to serve
members of their respective ethnic groups. Sandalow states:
Although it would be absurd to suppose that only a Jewish
lawyer can adequately represent a Jew or that only a black
lawyer can adequately represent a black, it is true nonetheless
that many Jews and many blacks (like many persons of other
-

-

-

165. ~ u c k l e ~ F u note
~ r a 115, 2 905.
166. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 56, 553 P.2d 1152, 1167,
132 Cai. Rptr. 680, 695 (1976).
167. Regarding such personal services contracts,
[i]t has been held that where an executory contract contains both positive and
negative promises, and the Court is unable to enforce the former, it may nevertheless enforce the latter by injunction. Thus, where a professional singer was
sued by the proprietor of a theater for specific performance of a contract to sing
a t his theater upon certain terms, and during a certain period to sing nowhere
else, the court refused to enforce so much of the contract as related to the
promise to sing, but enforced the promise not to sing ekewhere by grmting an
injunction.
SIMPSON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF CONTRACTS
406 (2d ed. 1965).
168. Gelhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1974 DUKEL.J. 1069, 1075. See also
O'Neil, supra note 137, at 329; Willey, supra note 28, at 222-23.
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ethnic and racial backgrounds) would prefer to be represented
by lawyers with an ethnic and racial identity similar to their
own. The satisfaction of these wants, absent strong countervailing reasons, ought to be a permissible goal of public policy.16v

Every individual should of course have the right, in selecting an
attorney or a physician, to favor those who are members of his
racial or ethnic group. But that fact does not imply that the state
has a compelling interest in ensuring that lawyers and doctors of
all racial and ethnic backgrounds are available. While the state
has an obligation to protect the health and welfare of its residents, it has no obligation to select a particular means to that end
when other comparable means exist. This is especially true if
selecting that particular means would require the suspension of
a right vouchsafed by the Constitution.

C. Racial Proportionality
Integration is, of course, a valid social goal. But some would
go even further, arguing that the state has a compelling interest
in achieving racial proportionality. Such arguments are usually
advanced with broad statements. "The integration of blacks and
other disadvantaged minorities into the larger economic, political
and social framework of the society continues to be an essential
social goal."170 "Minorities [have been] grossly underrepresented
in the medical profession."171"The importance of a fundamental
reordering of race relations in our society can scarcely be debated."172"The time for racial balance is now."173"The hope . . .
is to set in motion a chain reaction leading to the break-down of
a complex of conditions which today condemn large numbers of
people to lives of poverty and desperation." "[TIhe mere elimination of formal barriers"175is not enough; nothing short of "an
integrated society in which persons of all races are represented in
all walks of life and at all income levels"176is enough.
169. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 687 (footnote omitted).
170. Id. at 688.
171. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 85, 553 P.2d 1152, 1187,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 715 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
172. Karst and Horowitz, supra note 131, at 965.
173. Cohen, supra note 109, at 138.
174. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 689.
175. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.265
(1978).
176. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 87, 553 P.2d 1152, 1188,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 716 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).

66

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

Naturally, the assimilation of minorities into "all walks of
life" must include their entrance into the legal and medical professions. As demonstrated by the very existence of preferential
admissions programs, however, the use of traditional "objective"
admissions criteria "has disproportionately excluded minority
groups from higher education,"177and would likely continue to do
In addition, "many who have been thus denied access were
in fact qualified and would have done satisfactory academic
work."17@The demand, therefore, is not to admit unqualified minorities, but to admit qualified minorities, who by traditional
standards are less qualified than their white competitors1" and
consequently cannot become the doctors and lawyers needed to
accomplish the goal of eradicating racial imbalance.lg1Not to do
so would "mark a return to virtually all-white professional
schools," allowing the professions to remain "white enclaves."'"
The Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of EducationlMconceded that school authorities might "as
an educational policy" conclude that "in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students."lS4But the Court also
noted that the district court could not "require, as a matter of
substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial
balance or mixing."lss The Court has there and elsewherelg6been
unwilling to require strict proportionality of state schools. Furthermore, the school desegration cases can be distinguished on
the ground that they "deprive no one of a legally cognizable right
or benefit."1B7 Congress has shown a similar reluctance. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reads, in part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer . . .to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion,
177. O'Neil, supra note 14, at 945.
178. Margolis, supra note 10, at 420 & nn. 11 & 12. See Brief for Petitioner at 28-30;
Broderick, supra note 31, at 170-71, 180-87.
179. O'Neil, supra note 14, at 945.
180. See Brief for Petitioner a t 6.
181. 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
182. Brief for Petitioner at 13.
183. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
184. Id. a t 16.
185. Id. a t 24.
186. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court noted that "desegregation,
in the sense of dismantling a dual school system, does not require any particular racial
balance in each 'school, grade, or classroom.' " Id. at 740-41.
187. Lavinsky, supra note 109, a t 884 (footnote omitted).
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sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or nain comparison with
tional origin employed by any employer
the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, state, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community,
state, section, or other area.lss

...

Although in Bakke the University of .California asserted in
defense of their preferential admissions program that "[tlhe
ends of the program are universally recognized as compelling,"la
it adduced no evidence to that effect. What evidence there is
indicates, at best, widespread disagreement over the means chosen by the University to advance its ends, and, at worst, fundamental disagreement as to the ends themselves.lMCertainly one
would expect a greater consensus if an interest was truly compelling.
Professor Cohen opines that "the call for proportionality is
inspired by a strange vision of an ideal society-one that is pervaded by ethnic identification. According to that ideal the numerical proportionality of races is a principal measure of distributive justice in virtually every sphere of social life."lgl His is no idle
observation; the call may be heard even in Bakke. The following
passage from Brennan's Bakke opinion is freighted with meaning:
"States also may adopt race-conscious*programs designed to
overcome substantial, chronic minority underrepresentation
where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a prodIn other words, discriminauct of past racial di~crimination."~~~
tory (race-conscious) programs are valid so long as "the evil addressed" is the result of racial discrimination; but the important
point is that the term "the evil" is used not to describe racial
discrimination, but "minority underrepresentation." According
to this reasoning, minority underrepresentation is considered evil
per se (although not always redressable by the government)
whether or not it is cawed by racial discrimination. Implicit in
Brennan's statement is the premise that it is not racial discrimination per se that is objectionable, but the fact that the nation's
188. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 $703 Cj), 42 U.S.C.5 200012-2Cj) (1976).
189. Brief for Petitioner at 32.
190. See notes 109-11, 115 and accompanying text supra.
191. Cohen, supra note 109, at 142.
192. 438 U.S.at 366 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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social structure fails to conform to a particular idea of the model
state.
Here again, the question of a national consensus is relevant.
Why should a state be allowed to marshal1 its educational resources for the purpose of imposing this vision of a racial utopia
on its constituents, many of whom do not share in it? Indeed, as
Justice Douglas insisted in his DeFunis dissent, this concept runs
counter to the very concept of equal protection:
The State, however, may not proceed by racial classification to
force strict population equivalencies for every group in every
occupation, overriding individual preferences. The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not
their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society
ought to be organized.le3

It is now clear that undergirding much of the rhetoric supporting
preferential admissions-and affirmative action programs in general-is a view of justice that demands not that the state treat
its citizens without reference to their race, but that it rearrange
them precisely on the basis of their race. The objective is not
equal treatment but equal representation. Consequently, the goal
is not really equal opportunity; unless, of course, merely giving
people equal opportunities will cause them to voluntarily line up
in some predetermined order, which is possible but not likely. If
by chance, given equal opportunity, Americans were to rearrange
themselves along neatly racial lines, would preferential programs
no longer be needed? Or would they still be necessary to maintain
that delicate equilibrium?
Some would counter that but for pervasive discrimination in
the past American society would in fact be racially proportionate,
or close to it. Brennan's Bakke opinion does not go that far; it
merely contends that those who do go that far have good reason
to believe what they believe. For example, it states that "Davis
had a sound basis for believing" that undenepresentation was the
result of racial discrimination, that "Davis had very good reason
to believe" that a color-blind admission policy would not correct
the pattern of minority underrepresentation, and that "Davis
clearly could conclude" that minority underrepresentation is the
result of historical d i s c r i m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~
193. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.312, 342 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
194. 438 U.S. at 369-71 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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There are at least two reasons for being skeptical of the proposition that previous discrimination is the sole cause of minority
underrepresentation. The first is that the proposition cannot be,
or at least has not been, proven.lS5Brennan implicitly acknowledged this f a d (although he relied on the proposition anyway),
as demonstrated by the language quoted above. No one can doubt
that pervasive discrimination has contributed to the gross underrepresentation of minorities in, for example, the medical profession. On the other hand, the question of chronic minority underrepresentation is so fraught with variables that to conclude
blindly that the underrepresentation is "the result"lMof purposeful discrimination indicates an insensitivity to the complexities
of a difficult problem. To do so is to presuppose that in a multiracial society devoid of discrimination all races would be proportionately represented on all levels of society. A sweeping constitutional interpretation should not rest upon such an unsure foundation. An individual whose constitutional right is being suspended
deserves at least to be presented with evidence of the allegedly
compelling interest; the Court should not presume it.
The second reason for caution in this area is that even if one
were to attempt to prove the proposition that minority underrepresentation is caused by past discrimination, he could not base
his argument on the premise that discrimination always causes
underachievement. Indeed, it is plausible that discrimination
may in fact boost achievement. It would not be illogical to argue,
for example, that the spectacular intellectual record of the Jewish
people has been enhanced rather than impaired by what is certainly the longest if not the most brutal history of discrimination
in the world. On the other hand, if one insisted that the effects
of discrimination are always deleterious, he would be forced to
195. Glazer noted:
Absent discrimination, of course, one would expect nothing [like random distribution of women and minorities in all jobs]. Economists, labor market analysts,
and sociologists have devoted endless energy to trying to determine the various
elements that contribute to the distribution of jobs of minority groups. Some of
the relevant factors are: level of education, quality of education, type of education, location by region, by city, by part of the metropolitan area, character of
labor market at time of entry into the region or city, and many others. These
are factors one can in part quantify. Others-such as taste or, if you will, culture-are much more difficult to quantify. Discrimination is equally difficult to
quantify. To reduce all differences in labor force distribution (even for entrylevel jobs) to discrimination is an incredible simplification.
N. GLAZER,
supra note 117, a t 63.
196. 438 U.S. a t 370 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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conclude that but for past discrimination the overrepresentation
of Jewish people in academia would be even more pronounced
than it is today. Consider the further anomaly of the rather suspicious underrepresentation of Jewish people among the ranks of
professional baseball players.ln Is this "evil" the result of too
much discrimination or not enough?
Clearly, the attempt to characterize minority underrepresentation as the result of a single cause-discrimination-is
overly simplistic. Courts that adjudicate on the basis of that characterization, especially when constitutional rights hang in the
balance, are on perilous ground. The Constitution does not require our courts to manipulate the law in order to ensure proportionate representation of certain racial groups in all segments of
American society.

D. Student Body Diversity
From the grand vision of society arranged along racially proportionate lines springs a smaller vision, a vision of the student
bodies in state-supported professional schools arranged to reflect
the racial makeup of society at large. According to this view, there
is intrinsic value in a diverse student body. Medical schools, for
example, exist primarily for the purpose of training physicians to
serve the medical needs of a heterogeneous society. Justice Powell
observed in Bakke that the presence of minority students may
bring to a medical school "experiences, outlooks and ideas that
enrich the training of its student body and better equip its gaduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity ?"
Promoting a higher quality of education is certainly a legitimate state interest. The state has a responsibility to train competent doctors for all segments of society, especially those segments
that are presently medically underserviced. To ensure that every
medical school student has classmates who represent minority
racial groups seems a logical way to increase nonminority stu197. Consider the following statement:
Recently a spokesman for the Jewish Defense League commented with tongue
in cheek:
"Jews come from athletically deprived backgrounds. Irving is kept off
the sandlot by too much homework and too many music lessions. He
is now 25 and still can't play ball, but 'he has the desire to learn.'
Therefore, the Jewish Defense League is demanding that New York
City which has a 24 percent Jewish population, fill the city's ball
teams with 24 percent Jews."
G . ROCHE,
THEBALANCING
Am: QUOTA HIRING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
27-28 (1974).
198. 438 U.S.at 314 (footnote omitted).
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dents' rapport with minorities and to sensitize them to minority
health problems. There are, however, more direct and less constitutionally burdensome methods for accomplishing these ends,
such as courses geared to minority medical problems1n and special internship programs. The existence of less burdensome alternatives creates doubt as to the acceptability of quota admissions
programs."
In Bakke, however, Justice Powell took the student body
diversity argument one step further. He argued that academic
freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment," and that
"[tlhe freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body."a1 Thus, he
concluded, although a university does not have a first amendment right to establish rigid racial quotas, it may constitutionally
consider the race of its applicants if it does so in order to enhance
the educational atmosphere of its campus.202By implication, the
protection of this first amendment right is a compelling reason to
override the applicant's fourteenth amendment right not to be
discriminated against on account of race. State schools are allowed to prefer some applicants (and thereby penalize others) on
the ground that their race is, of itself, a "plus." The following
statement by Justice Powell is reminiscent of those of Terrance
Sandalow quoted earlier:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his
potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race
being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an
applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is
thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial
educational pluralism. Such qualities could include exceptional
personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of
overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the
poor, or other qualifications deemed important. In short, an
199. Such courses are apparently already offered at Davis. Preferential Racial Admissions, supra note 30, at 751.
200. The Court has held:
Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with "precision," and
must be "tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives. And if there are other,
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally
protected activity, a state may not choose the way of greater interference. If it
acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means."
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.330, 343 (1972) (citations omitted).
201. 438 U.S. at 312.
202. Id. at 314.
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admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant . . . .203

Justice Powell also stated:
The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another
candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background
will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat
simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong
surname. It would mean only that his combined qualifications,
which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not
outweigh those of the other applicant.204

The implication here is very strong that race holds no special
constitutional place, but rather that it may be considered as one
of many nonobjective admissions criteria. This conclusion appears to repudiate the bulk of the opinion, which seems to be
squarely based on the view that race holds a special place in
constitutional jurisprudence. Furthermore, Justice Powell took
great pains to avoid saying that the excluded applicant was not
excluded because of his race. What he did say is that the applicant was not "foreclosed from all consideration" because of his
race. The difference, however, does not seem to go to the constitutional point. It is clear that giving a "plus" to a minority student
is quite meaningless unless the plus will give that minority student some concrete benefit he would not have had without it. In
competition for admissions, there is only one concrete benefit:
admission. And it is logically impossible to deny the other side
of the coin: for every minority student whose plus made the difference for him between admission and rejection there will perforce
be a nonminority student who was excluded because he lacked
the plus; excluded, in other words, because of his race. In the face
of that inescapable fact, the excluded applicant cannot rightly be
expected to take consolation that, although his race prevented
his admission, it did not prevent his consideration. The purpose
of applying, after all, is not to be considered, but to be admitted.
Justice Powell's defense of this racially discriminatory practice is grounded on the first amendment: state universities have
a constitutional right to decide, on academic grounds, whom they
will admit. That assertion raises a t least two separate questions.
First of all, if such a right exists in favor of a state institution,
203. Id. at 317.
204. Id. at 318.
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it has never before been recognized. The only opinion quoted in
support of this rightzo5is a concurring opinion by Justice Frank. ~ ~ dispute in that case
furter in Sweezy v. New H a m p ~ h i r eThe
centered around whether an employee of a state university could
be penalized for refusing to answer the state attorney general's
questions pertaining to the employee's connection with an allegedly subversive organization. The subject of admissions was
never broached. Furthermore, the rationale and holding of the
case are based on the constitutional rights of individuals, not
institution^.^^
Secondly, Justice Powell seems to be suggesting that a governmental body may be possessed of a constitutional right. Consider the following passage from Bakke: "Thus, in arguing that
its universities must be accorded the right to select those students
who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,'
petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of
the First Amendment."z08There is enough vagueness in the language to leave room for doubt, but it appears that Justice Powell
is recognizing in a state university the capacity to invoke the first
amendment in its own behalf. The suggestion is unprecedented.
It is unnecessary here to review the theory of constitutional rights
any more than to observe that their function has always been to
protect the individual against the power of the government,
rather than, as Justice Powell seems to suggest, protecting the
government against the power of the individual.
It has long been recognized that individuals employed by
governmental agencies, such as state universities, are possessed
of constitutional rights. In fact, the two cases Justice Powell cited
on this subject held precisely that. In Sweezy, for example, the
Court wrote: "Equally manifest as a fundamental principle of a
democratic society is political freedom of the individual. Our
form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall
have the right to engage in political expression and associadealt with the
Likewise,
Keyishian v. Board of Regentsz1@
ti~n."~
@
first amendment rights of individual teachers. The Court stated
that " '[olur nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 312.
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
See id.
438 U.S. at 313.
354 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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merely to the teachers concerned.' "211 The academic freedom referred to was not the right of the state university as an institution,
or the faculty as a body, but the climate of freedom which follows
inexorably from allowing each individual teacher his or her full
scope of expression; it is the sum total of many individuals exercising their individual freedom. The "robust exchange of ideas"
commended by Justice Powel1212results naturally in an environment free from governmentally imposed restraints on basic freedoms. Once the government assumes the responsibility of ensuring that the exchange of ideas is sufficiently robust, it is in danger
of stifling the very exchange it seeks to promote. Nothing is as
certain to destroy the free marketplace of ideas as governmental
interference.
IV.

DIAGNOSING
Bakke

A. Equal Protection Derailed
It is not surprising that the result reached by Justice Powell
in Bakke was very different from that reached by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun; he applied a different view
of equal protection. In the main, Justice Powell adopted the symmetrical view of equal protection. "The guarantee of equal protection," he wrote, "cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it
is not equal."213Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, on the other hand, adopted the preferential view. "[A]
state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact
its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to believe
that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discriminati~n."~l'
The two opinions thus proceeded independently of each
other; they moved in the same direction, but on parallel courses
as it were, sharing little or no common ground. That their destinations overlapped is curious. They did so primarily because
Justice Powell surprisingly found a compelling state interest
where neither party had-in the first amendment right of a
governmental institution. This derailment of Powell's analysis
211. 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, .385 U.S. at 603).
212. Id. at 313.
213. Id. at 289-90.
214. Id. at 369 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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kept his opinion from reaching its otherwise obvious conclusion
-a result that would have enhanced the stability and persuasiveness of Bakke and better protected the integrity of the equal
protection clause itself. The ultimate derailment of the Powell
opinion, and consequently of the equal protection clause, fundamentally undermines Bakke.

B. The Larger Question
It is fitting that the requirements of the "compelling state
interest" test are stringent; the lifeblood of a constitutional safeguard is its inviolability. Carl Cohen has observed:
A constitution, ideally, is not an expression of particular social
needs; rather, it identifies very general common purposes and
lays down principles according to which the many specific ends
of the body politic may be decided upon and pursued. Its most
critical provisions will be those which absolutely preclude certain means. Thus to say that a protection afforded citizens is
"constitutional" is a t least to affirm that it will be respected,
come what may. The specific constitutional provision that each
citizen is entitled to equal protection of the laws is assurance
that, no matter how vital the government alleges its interest to
be, or how laudable the objective of those who would temporarily suspend that principle, it will stand.*15

A constitutional right that is honored only when there is no pressing reason to dishonor it is of minimal value, for in those cases
there is very little to protect against. It is when public sentiment,
the wisdom of the experts, social statistics, humanitarian impulses, and national goals all seem to militate against respecting a
particular safeguard that the safeguard is to be most respected;
unless it is respected then, it is no safeguard. A right existing only
at the pleasure of some judicial tribunal, even the Supreme Court
of the United States, and which may be revoked by that tribunal
at will, is constitutional in name only. When the Court undertakes to remake constitutional rules to accommodate specific social goals, or when it stops looking a t what a provision means, and
begins to speculate on how it can be used, the integrity of the
document has been compromised.
Justice Douglas sensed this principle in his now famous
DeFunis dissent: "If discrimination based on race is constitutionally permissible when those who hold the reins can come up with
215. Cohen, supra note 109, at 139-40.
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"compelling" reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees
acquire an accordianlike quality. "116Justice Jackson recognized
it when he penned the following passage in West Virginia Board
of Education u. Barr~ette:~l'
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections.*18

Justice Jackson went further in his Korematsu dissent to warn
that once the practice of making exceptions is begun, "[tlhe
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand
of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need. "21B
Bakke is, however, more complex than Korematsu. In
Korematsu, the Court was called upon to draw a line: How important must a governmental interest be before it can be classed as
"compelling"? On the other hand, the central question of Bakke
was whether to sanction two separate lines, one for minority
Americans and the other for nonminorities. The decision of where
each line should be drawn is subordinate to the decision of
whether or not to draw two lines.220By insisting that the compelling interest be defined in racial terms, proponents of preferential
admissions demand that a recognized constitutional right be suspended because it is exercised by the wrong person. The Bakke
Court's answer to the central question was uncertain, but the
question will not go away.121 It is too persistent, too terrible, to
be dismissed with an ambiguous gesture.
At any rate, the Court has now struck to the heart of the
matter. Anglo-American jurisprudence has been, over the decades, over the centuries, agonizingly winding its way to the reali216. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
217. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
218. Id. at 638.
219. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) ( J a c k s o L
~ , dissenting).
220. An analogous case in the free speech area would only incidentally involve deciding how inflammatory a political statement has to be before it is no longer protected by
the first amendment; it would primarily involve deciding whether certain political group
have the right to make remarks that are more inflammatory than those other political
groups may make.
221. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 559.
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zation of the ideal that Bracton, four hundred years ago, memorialized with the words, "The King is subject not to men, but to
God and the law."222Now it seems that, in one area of national
life a t least, rule by law has nearly become a reality. Bakke now
forces the question: Is rule by law what the nation really wants?
Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing debate over the wisdom,
urgency, or legality of preferential admissions, the real question
will remain whether this nation is truly dedicated to a government of law and not of men. Because this is the question, it is
relatively insignificant that the class to be singled out for special
treatment is underprivileged rather than privileged; in either
case, the impartiality of law is violated.223And the violation of the
rule-of-law principle is not without its risks, as Friedrich A.
Hayek has warned: "It is the Rule of Law, in the sense of the rule
of formal law, the absence of legal privileges of particular people
designated by authority, which safeguards that equality before
the law which is the opposite of arbitrary government. "224 To the
extent that the courts are willing to enforce laws selectively in
order to achieve effects on particular people, they must forfeit
their claim to impartiality.225Furthermore, once the government
has taken upon itself the duty of altering rules for this or that
person, party, or group, it must decide which person, party, or
group requires assistance. Such a course inevitably results in official capriciousne~s.~~~
The dilemma was aptly articulated by John
Stuart Mill: "We should be glad to see just conduct enforced and
injustices repressed, even in the minutest details, if we were not,
with reason, afraid of trusting the magistrate with so unlimited
an amount of power over individual^."^^
It may be that preferential admissions programs stem "from
a desire to 'do something,' even though all that is within our
power to do . . . is unsuitable or even counterproductive as a
means of meeting the problem. . . . What we can do is . . .
admit the deprived to our . . . schools. It a t least shows where
our hearts are."228It may be that those who defend programs such
222. Quoted in T. P L U C K NA~CONCISE
,
HISTORY
OF THE COMMON
LAW 49 (5th ed.
1956).
223. "You shall not pervert justice, either by favouring the poor or by subservience
to the great." Leviticus 19:15 (New English version).
224. F. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
79 (1944).
225. Id. at 76.
226. Id. at 73-74.
JUSTICE
AND EQUALITY
53 (1971).
227. Mill, Utilitarianism, in H. BEDAU,
228. Graglia, supra note 109, at 353.
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as the one under fire in Bakke are pained by the plight of members of society who seem to have little or no access to advantages
that other members take for granted. It may be that they are
moved when they look upon their fellows struggling, but unable,
to find their way into the mainstream of American life. It may
well be that they tremble with impatience a t the uncharitable
posture that many voices demand the state universities .take.
Nevertheless, it is finally justice, not charity, that must be demanded from the government. It is only to justice, not to charity,
that favoritism is f ~ r b i d d e nit; ~is~only in justice that the unlovable or unpopular can find refuge when public sentiment is against
them; and it is only justice-formal justice-that keeps government from being entirely arbitrary.
The establishment of universal happiness cannot be relegated to those who have ultimate power over life and property.
Indeed, even the definition of happiness cannot be relegated to
them. The state can be trusted to establish fair, formal rules
within which each citizen can define and pursue his own happiness. But when the state unconstitutionally refuses to stay its
hand, even in the pursuit of some laudable objective; when it
insists on overstepping the bounds of justice in the name of justice; when it substitutes, for a system of impartial, generalized
rules, a headlong rush towards some utopian vision, however glorious; then to that extent, individual life, liberty, and happiness
must ultimately be abandoned.
-

229. See

C. PERELMAN,
supra note 107, at 41.

